


Michael V. Dougherty
Ohio Dominican University

IN THE AFTERMATH OF AUTHORSHIP VIOLATIONS IN PHILOSOPHY: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS



COPE North American Seminar 2019
Philadelphia
May 3, 2019

Pseudonyms in Philosophy

In what scenarios do authors use pseudonyms?

- To discuss or promote one's previously-published work
- To hide authorship in "hoax" articles
- To protect authors of unpopular or controversial opinions
- To hide one's identity from a particular journal editor

Perspectives on Self-Deception

Edited by Brian P. McLaughlin and Amélie Oksenberg Rorty

CONTRIBUTORS

Amélie Oksenberg Rorty is a professor of philosophy at Rutgers University.

Brian P. McLaughlin is an associate professor of philosophy at Rutgers University.
Mark Johnston is an associate professor of philosophy at Princeton University.
Robert Audi is a professor of philosophy at the University of Nebraska.
Bas C. van Fraassen is a professor of philosophy at Princeton University.
David H. Sanford is a professor of philosophy at Duke University.
Adam Morton is a professor of philosophy at the University of Bristol.
Frederick F. Schmitt is an associate professor of philosophy at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign.
Allen W. Wood is a professor of philosophy at the Sage School of Philosophy, Cornell University.

Leila Tov-Ruach is an Israeli Psychiatrist, who writes and lectures on philosophical psychology.

Georges Key is an associate professor of philosophy at the University of Maryland.
Adrian M. S. Piper is an associate professor of philosophy at Georgetown University.
Ronald B. de Sousa is a professor of philosophy at the University of Toronto.
Rom Harré is a professor of philosophy at Oxford University.
William Ruddick is a professor of philosophy at New York University.
Bruce Wilshire is a professor of philosophy at Rutgers University.
Stephen L. Darwall is a professor of philosophy at the University of Michigan.
Marcia Baron is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign.
Stephen L. White is an assistant professor of philosophy at Tufts University.
Martha Nussbaum is a professor of philosophy at Brown University.
Margret Kohlenbach is a lecturer of German at the University of Sussex.
Rüdiger Bittner is professor of philosophy at the Hochschule Hildesheim, West Germany.

Leila Tov-Ruach is an Israeli Psychiatrist, who writes and lectures on philosophical psychology.

Amélie Oksenberg Rorty is a professor of philosophy at Rutgers University.

Rorty = Tov-Ruach

EXPLAINING EMOTIONS

Edited by Amélie Oksenberg Rorty

Contributors by

James Beall • Arneil Rorty • Lawrence Rorty • Ronald de Sousa •
Paul Ekman • Richard E. Granger • Arnold Rosenberg • Nozomu Matsuura •
Domenico Mariotti • David Matthews • Adam Morton • Jennifer Nash •
Georgios Patas • Amélie O. Rorty • Roger Scruton • Robert C. Solomon •
Michael Stoeberl • Corine Storer • Leif von Borch • Richard
Worth

12. Cf. Amélie Rorty, "Explaining Emotions," this volume, chap. 4.

13. Cf. Spinoza, *The Ethics*, Part II-IV, and Kant, *The Critique of Pure Reason*, The Antinomies and Paralogisms.

14. I am grateful to Amélie Rorty for the hospitality that made the writing of this paper possible. She was kind enough to make available to me a number of the papers published in this volume: stimulated by them, and by her skeptical questions, I was able to work through some problems that arose from Stanley Cavell's interpretation of *Othello*. Discussions with Marcia Aufhauser and Margaret Gilbert were helpful:

VERIDICAL HALLUCINATION AND PROSTHETIC VISION

David Lewis

I

I see. Before my eyes various things are present and various things are going on. The scene before my eyes causes a certain sort of visual experience in me, thanks to a casual process involving light, the retina, the optic nerve, and the brain. The visual experience so caused more or less matches the scene before my eyes. All this goes on in much the same way in my case as in the case of other people who see. And it goes on in much the same way that it would have if the scene before my eyes had been visibly different, though in that case the visual experience produced would have been different.

How much of all this is essential to seeing?

Princeton University

Received May 1980
Corrected June 1980

DISCUSSION

CENSORED VISION

Bruce Le Catt

When we see in the normal way, the scene before the eyes causes matching visual experience. And it does so as part of an extensive pattern of counterfactual dependence: over a wide range of different alternative scenes and correspondingly different alternative experiences, other scenes would likewise have caused matching visual experience. The same is true if we see in certain abnormal ways, for instance by means of a prosthetic device. But abnormal cases are possible in which the scene before the eyes might cause matching visual experience by triggering some one-off or random causal mechanism, insensitive to the details of the scene, which just happens to produce the right experience. In such a case, matching depends on the scene

Princeton, N. J.

Received August 1981

David Lewis = Bruce Le Catt

PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS

Volume II

DAVID LEWIS

good pattern of counterfactual dependence whereby visual experience depends on what goes on at the intermediate stage. Further, this two-fold pattern might link scenes indirectly with matching experience, over a suitably wide and varied range of scenes. Even more indirectly, there might be linkage via a threefold pattern of counterfactual dependence involving two intermediate stages; and so on. Then we have a suitable pattern of stepwise counterfactual dependence of visual experience on the scene before the eyes. It does not follow that we have a suitable pattern of counterfactual dependence *simpliciter*, because counterfactuals are not necessarily transitive.⁴ In fact my case of the censor is a case of excellent stepwise dependence and no dependence *simpliciter* at all. LeCatt suggests, and I agree, that it is the stepwise dependence that accounts for any inclinations we have to judge the case of the censor as a positive case of seeing. He further claims that this judgment is correct; but there I do not agree, and I insist that the essential feature of seeing is altogether missing.

But there are mixed cases: partial or conditional censorship, some dependence *simpliciter* but not much compared with normal cases. Then indeed the presence of stepwise dependence might make the difference between better cases and worse.

What is wrong with the occasional pseudonym?

- Lessens author accountability
- Hinders an accurate history of philosophy
- Produces an illusion of increased interest in a topic
- Creates a downstream literature problem



Pseudonyms in Philosophy

- In 2017, I sent authorship clarification requests to editors and publishers for 11 pseudonymously published articles in philosophy

	Journal or publisher	Author of record	Genuine author(s)	Status of request	Type of clarification
1	<i>Analysis</i>	“Diodorus Cronus”	Steven Cahn; Richard Taylor	Unresolved	
2	<i>Analysis</i>	“Al. Tajtelbaum”	Alfred Tarski	Unresolved	
3	<i>Australasian Journal of Philosophy</i>	“Bruce Le Catt”	David Lewis	Granted	Erratum (Anonymous 2017d)
4	<i>Journal of Philosophy</i>	“Carmen de Macedo”	Neven Sesardić	Granted	Corrigendum (Anonymous 2017e)
5	<i>Mind</i>	“R. E. Hobart”	Dickinson S. Miller	Denied	–
6	<i>Mind</i>	“R. E. Hobart”	Dickinson S. Miller	Denied	–
7	<i>Mind</i>	“R. E. Hobart”	Dickinson S. Miller	Denied	–
8	<i>Philosophical Studies</i>	“M. Lisagor”	Joseph Margolis	Granted	Correction (Margolis 2018)
9	<i>Southern Journal of Philosophy</i>	“Diodorus Cronus”	Richard Taylor	Granted	Corrigendum (Anonymous 2018)
10	<i>University of California Press</i>	“Leila Tov-Ruach”	Amélie Oksenberg Rorty	Granted	Erratum (University of California Press 2017a)
11	<i>University of California Press</i>	“Leila Tov-Ruach”	Amélie Oksenberg Rorty	Granted	Erratum (University of California Press 2017b)

6 of the 11 articles were corrected with published clarifications of authorship

AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, 2017
<https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2017.1358248>

 **Australasian Association of Philosophy**
 **Routledge**
Taylor & Francis Group

[Check for updates](#)


Erratum

Le Catt Bruce 1982. Censored Vision, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 60/2: 158-162.

<http://doi.org/10.1080/00048408212340581>

The Australasian Association of Philosophy would like to clarify that 'Bruce Le Catt', was a pseudonym used by the author David Lewis, to discuss some work published under his own name.

Philos Stud (2018) 175:1827
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1079-6>

 CrossMark

CORRECTION

Correction to: On Harman's theory of knowledge

Joseph Margolis¹

Published online: 3 April 2018
© Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018

Correction to: Philos Stud June 1976, Volume 29, Issue 6, pp 433–439
<https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00646324>

In the original publication of the article, the corresponding author used pseudonym as 'M. Lisagor'. The correct name is given in this correction.

The Southern Journal of Philosophy
Volume 56, Issue 1
March 2018

EDITORIAL CORRIGENDUM

The following article was published in the *Southern Journal of Philosophy* under a pseudonym: Diodorus Cronus, "The Governance of the Kingdom of Darkness: A Philosophical Fable," *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 9, no. 2 (June 1971): 113–18. The author's true name is Richard Taylor.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS

Home | Browse Books | Journals | Open Access

PHILOSOPHY

Subjects • Philosophy • Social & Political Philosophy

Ethics
Philosophy of Aesthetics
Social & Political Philosophy

Perspectives on Self-Deception
Brian P. McLaughlin (Editor), Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (Editor)
Available worldwide
Topics in Philosophy

Paperback, 568 pages
ISBN: 9780520061231
September 1988
\$39.95, £32.95

FOR PROFESSORS
Request a Desk or Examination Copy
RIGHTS INFORMATION
Permissions
RightsLink
Foreign & Other Subsidiary Rights

Erratum (October 2017)
It has been brought to the attention of UC Press that the following chapter in *Perspectives on Self-Deception* is published under a pseudonym: Laila Tov-Ruach, "Freud on Unconscious Affects, Mourning, and the Erotic Mind," pp. 246-263.
UC Press would like to clarify that "Laila Tov-Ruach" is a pseudonym used by one of the co-editors of the volume, Amélie Oksenberg Rorty.

392

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

CORRIGENDUM

The Journal of Philosophy would like to inform its readers that the following article was published under a pseudonym:

Carmen de Macedo, "Guilt by Statistical Association: Revisiting the Prosecutor's Fallacy and the Interrogator's Fallacy," this JOURNAL, cv, 6 (June 2008): 320–32.

The author is Prof. Neven Sesardić (formerly at Lingnan University, now retired).

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS

Home | Browse Books | Journals | Open Access

PHILOSOPHY

Subjects • Philosophy • Ethics

Ethics
Philosophy of Aesthetics
Social & Political Philosophy

Explaining Emotions
Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (Editor)
Available worldwide
Topics in Philosophy

Paperback, 543 pages
ISBN: 9780520039216
May 1980
\$38.95, £32.95

FOR PROFESSORS
Request a Desk or Examination Copy
RIGHTS INFORMATION
Permissions
Foreign & Other Subsidiary Rights

Erratum (October 2017)
It has been brought to the attention of UC Press that the following chapter in *Explaining Emotions* is published under a pseudonym: Laila Tov-Ruach, "Jealousy, Attention, and Loss," pp. 465-488.
UC Press would like to clarify that "Laila Tov-Ruach" is a pseudonym used by the editor of the volume, Amélie Oksenberg Rorty.

Solutions

To avoid post-publication pseudonym surprises:

- Explicitly encourage institutional email addresses in manuscript submission portals
- Require identity confirmation for submissions from unaffiliated authors (e.g., link to web presence)
- Require authors to use ORCID identifiers in submission portal
- Issue corrections for past articles published under pseudonyms

Plagiarism

Why should editors, publishers, and researchers be concerned about plagiarism in published research articles?

*Plagiarism creates inefficiencies
across all levels of knowledge production.*


Plagiarizing articles

- Deny genuine researchers credit for their work
- Falsify the history of discovery
- Create duplications in the research literature
- Take up valuable space in journals that should have gone to authentic articles
- Waste the time and resources of editors, peer reviewers, publishers, whistleblowers
- Confer an illusion of research productivity to plagiarists, and this façade can generate unwarranted promotions, grants, new offers of employment, book contracts
- Are Doppelgänger articles, taking citations away from their hidden sources, thereby disrupting impact factors, bibliometrics, and altmetrics (The Downstream Problem)


ADDITIONS
TO THE
PUBLISHED
RESEARCH
LITERATURE:
THE
NORMATIVE
ROUTE




ADDITIONS
TO THE
PUBLISHED
RESEARCH
LITERATURE:
THE
NORMATIVE
ROUTE




ADDITIONS TO
THE RESEARCH
PUBLISHED
LITERATURE: THE
NON-NORMATIVE
ROUTE



ADDITIONS TO THE PUBLISHED LITERATURE: THE *NON-NORMATIVE* ROUTE




ADDITIONS TO THE PUBLISHED LITERATURE: THE *NON-NORMATIVE* ROUTE




ADDITIONS TO THE PUBLISHED LITERATURE: THE *NON-NORMATIVE* ROUTE

Plagiarizing Articles Generate a
Corruption of the Downstream
Research Literature



The Whistleblower as Undeceived Reader



To whom can one blow the ethical whistle for suspected plagiarism?



Whistleblowers need guidance from journals and publishers.

Varieties of Plagiarism in Philosophy

- Straightforward Plagiarism
- Disguised Plagiarism


COPY-AND-PASTE PLAGIARISM: SEVERAL SOURCES

Subjectivity from a Semiotic Point of View

1. Preliminary Remarks

I would like to say something here about the concept of subjectivity from a semiotic point of view. Of course I am not the first to deal with this problem. Though subjectivity has received little attention by semioticians in the past, this situation has changed dramatically in the last decade. It is now by no means unusual to find articles or entire monographs dealing with subjectivity, written in English, French or other European languages. An interest in subjectivity semiotics is no longer an eccentricity, one might even say that it has recently become fashionable. Semiotics involves the study of signification, but signification cannot be isolated from the human subject who produces and is defined by it. So if the topic needs no apology, some preliminary remarks on the sense of this ambiguous term might nevertheless be helpful.



Among linguists the notion of *subjectivity* concerns the expression of self and the representation of a speaker's – or, more generally, a locutionary agent's – perspective or point of view in discourse (cf. Stein & Wright 1995). Among other professional students of language, the word *subject* and its derivative *subjectivity* tend to evoke a grammatical association: subject as distinct from direct object, for example. In some contexts, *subjectivity* contrasts with objectivity in suggesting something "soft", unverifiable, even suspicious. The notion of subjectivity plays various roles in European languages (Lyons 1982: 101). While the English "subjectivity" has recently acquired a somewhat pejorative connotation, by virtue of its opposition with a positivistic interpretation of "objectivity", the French "subjectivité" and the German



Silverman p. 3

Finegan p. 1

Lyons, p. 101



COPY-AND-PASTE PLAGIARISM: SOURCE 1

[N.]. 2001a. Subjectivity from a Semiotic Point of View,” In *Ecosemiotics: Studies in environmental semiosis*, Nordic-Baltic Summer Institute for Semiotic and Structural Studies, Part IV, ed. Eero Tarasti et al. 149–159. Imatra: International Semiotics Institute, at 156–157.

the primordial uniqueness of the human being, and thus for the basic irreducibility of the human being to the natural world. This assumption forms the basis of understanding the human being as a person. Traditional Aristotelian anthropology was based on the definition of *anthropos zoon noetikon* (*homo est animal rationale*). This definition fulfills Aristotle’s requirements for defining the species (human being) through its proximate genus (living being) and the feature that distinguishes the given species in that genus (endowed with reason). At the same time, however, the definition is constructed in such a way that it excludes – at least at first glance – the possibility of accentuating the irreducible in the human being. In this definition the human being is mainly an object, one of the objects in the world to which the human being visibly and physically belongs. In this perspective, objectivity was connected with the general assumption of the reducibility of the human being. The term subjectivity, on the other hand, proclaims that the human being’s proper essence cannot be reduced and explained by the proximate genus and specific difference. In other words: Subjectivity is a synonym for the irreducible in the human being.

Pope John Paul II / Karol Wojtyła. 1993. Subjectivity and the Irreducible in the Human Being. In *Person and Community: Selected Essays*, trans. Theresa Sandok, 209–217. New York: Peter Lang, at 211 and 210–211.

the primordial uniqueness of the human being, and thus in the basic irreducibility of the human being to the natural world [...]. This belief stands at the basis of understanding the human being as a person [...]. // Traditional Aristotelian anthropology was based, as we know, on the definition of *anthropos zoon noetikon, homo est animal rationale*. This definition fulfills Aristotle’s requirements for defining the species (human being) through its proximate genus (living being) and the feature that distinguishes the given species in that genus (endowed with reason). At the same time, however, the definition is constructed in such a way that it excludes—when taken simply and directly—the possibility of accentuating the irreducible in the human being. // In [...] definition *homo est animal rationale*, the human being was mainly an object, one of the objects in the world to which the human being visibly and physically belongs. Objectivity in this sense was connected with the general assumption of the reducibility of the human being. Subjectivity, on the other hand, is, as it were, a term proclaiming that the human being’s proper essence cannot be totally reduced to and explained by the proximate genus and specific difference. Subjectivity is, then, a kind of synonym for the irreducible in the human being.

COPY-AND-PASTE PLAGIARISM: SOURCE 2

[N.]. 2001a. Subjectivity from a Semiotic Point of View,” In *Ecosemiotics: Studies in environmental semiosis*, Nordic-Baltic Summer Institute for Semiotic and Structural Studies, Part IV, ed. Eero Tarasti et al. 149–159. Imatra: International Semiotics Institute, at 153–154.

in a misunderstanding of the reflexive pronoun. To ask what kind of substance my “self” is, is like asking what the characteristic of “ownness” is, an attribute which my own property has in addition to being mine. When, outside philosophical reflections I, talk about myself, I am simply talking about the human being, [N.], and my self is nothing other than myself. In some way it is a philosophical muddle to allow the space which differentiates “my self” from “myself” to generate the illusion of a mysterious metaphysical entity distinct from, but obscurely linked to, the human being who is talking to someone. The grammatical error which is the essence of the theory of the self may seem obvious when it is pointed out. But it is by no means easy to give an accurate account of the logic, or deep grammar, of the words “I” and “myself”. It will not do, for instance, to say simply that “I” is the word each of us uses to refer to himself, a pronoun which, when it occurs in sentences, is synonymous with the name of the utterer of the sentence. This is not difficult to show. Julius Caesar, in his *Commentaries*, regularly described his own actions in the third person, using the name “Caesar”

Anthony Kenny, 1988. *The Self. The Aquinas Lecture, 1988.* Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 4–5.

in a misunderstanding of the reflexive pronoun. To ask what kind of substance my *self* is is like asking what the characteristic of *ownness* is which my own property has in addition to being mine. When, outside philosophy, I talk about myself, I am simply talking about the human being, **Anthony Kenny**, and my self is nothing other than myself. It is a philosophical muddle to allow the space which differentiates “my self” from “myself” to generate the illusion of a mysterious metaphysical entity distinct from, but obscurely linked to, the human being who is talking to you. The grammatical error which is the essence of the theory of the self is in a manner obvious when it is pointed out. But it is [...] by no means easy to give an accurate account of the logic, or deep grammar, of the words “I” and “myself.” It will not do, for instance, to say simply that “I” is the word each of us uses to refer to himself, a pronoun which when it occurs in sentences is synonymous with the name of the utterer of the sentence. This is not difficult to show. Julius Caesar, in his *Commentaries*, regularly described his own actions in the third person, using the name “Caesar”



ISI semiotics

@ISIsemiotics

Following

Statement of retraction

We have received a letter from personnel of the Ohio Dominican University, supported...

fb.me/1uYkeHheP

3:32 AM - 13 Jan 2018

1 Retweet



1



International Semiotics Institute



Michael



Like



Following



Share



International
Semiotics Institute
[@isisemiotics](https://www.facebook.com/isisemiotics)

To this effect, the present letter constitutes an official statement of retraction of that essay.

This means, among other things, that:

- We wish to dissociate ourselves from that essay, stating clearly that it does not represent us, or our publishing policy.
- We hope that this statement will reach out to all those colleagues and readers who are in possession of that book, so that they can be aware of this situation.
- Should this book be republished in any form, hard-copy or e-copy, we will make sure that the essay is not included anymore in the collection. As International Semiotics Institute, we are fully committed to academic honesty, and we wish to apologize to the damaged parties for this



KAUNAS UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, ARTS AND HUMANITIES INTERNATIONAL SEMIOTICS INSTITUTE

Mickevičius St. 37, LT-44240 Kaunas, Lithuania
+370 37 320546; isisemiotics@gmail.com, isi@ktu.lt
www.isisemiotics.eu

To whom it may concern

Kaunas 08-01-2018

OBJECT: **Statement of retraction**

We have received a letter from personnel of the Ohio Dominican University, supported also by Marquette University Press, concerning an essay appeared in a 2001 collection from Acta Semiotica Fennica (a book series launched by our institute). In its key-passage, the letter reads as follows:

We have observed that a chapter appearing in a volume published by the International Semiotics Institute appears to fall short of adequate citation practices. It is:

Peter Schulz, "Subjectivity from a Semiotic Point of View," in Nordic-Baltic Summer Institute for Semiotic and Structural Studies, Part IV. Ecosemiotics: Studies in Environmental Semiosis, Semiotics of the Biocybernetic Bodies, Human / Too Human / Post Human, edited by Eero Tarasti, Richard Littlefield, Lotta Rossi, Maija Rossi (International Semiotics Institute, 2001): 149-159.

The chapter appears to consist substantively of texts pieced together from various authors without quotation marks, either with inadequate attribution or no attribution at all. The document accompanying this letter highlights select passages from the article that are taken verbatim or near verbatim from works by other authors.

The claim was supported by ample evidence, and was followed by a "request for retraction" from our part.

To verify the claim, we have appointed a committee to read carefully through Prof. Schulz's text, and cross-check with the sources indicated by the colleagues at Ohio Dominican University.

After the examination, we regret to say that the committee has fully confirmed the claim, and therefore has declared the essay in question plagiarized from various sources.

To this effect, the present letter constitutes an **official statement of retraction** of that essay.

This means, among other things, that:

- We wish to dissociate ourselves from that essay, stating clearly that it does not represent us, or our publishing policy.

Disguised plagiarism

- Typically immune to standard text-matching software
- Often unrecognized even by those familiar with the original source text
- Highly invisible to unsuspecting readers

Varieties of Disguised Plagiarism include:

Compression Plagiarism

- The distillation of a lengthy scholarly text into a short one, followed by the publication of the short one under a new name with inadequate credit to the original author
- Example: a lengthy book might be compressed into an article and published under new authorship

Translation Plagiarism

- The work of one author is republished in a different language with authorship credit taken by someone else
- Example: an article in German is published in English under new authorship

A Case of Suspected Compression Plagiarism: N. 2006

In order to clarify my point, I am going first to distinguish between two different concepts of reasonableness: a strong and a weak one. Drawing upon this distinction, I shall further demonstrate in what sense Tindale refers to a weak concept, whereas the pragma-dialectic approach applies a strong concept of reasonableness. This clarification should help us, finally, to understand to what extent rhetoric might be considered as reasonable on its own terms.

If one departs from the colloquial use of the word “reasonable” or “rational”,¹ one notices immediately that this term can encompass several different things depending on the objective area to which it is applied: deliberation, opinions, or arguments may be candidates for reasonableness within the cognitive area; actions within the behavioral area; and desires within the emotional area. When we call discourses, arguments, or thoughts reasonable, we are referring to them neither as to linguistic constructs nor as regards the respective content of their declarative statements (technically speaking, the proposition or the propositional subject matter). Such a content is either true or false, but not reasonable or unreasonable. Rather, by using the expression “reasonable” we are describing opinions in a much broader sense. In the following, “opinion” should be understood as a proposition held to be true. Holding a proposition to be true includes believing, expecting, supposing *something*, being convinced *of something*, considering its possibility, etc. So, holding an opinion is a relation between a subject (S) and a proposition (P), which can be formalized as “S is of the opinion that *p*...”. To be exact, one has to add: *S* is of the opinion *p* at a certain point in time or during a certain period of time (*t*), i.e. “S is of the opinion *p* at time *t*.”

A further insight into the meaning of the word “reasonable” can be gained by looking at its opposite. In contrast with simple descriptive words, the expression “unreasonable” possess a normative component in our cultural context. To say that someone is behaving unreasonably means not only to suggest that a certain statement or action of the subject has the named characteristic. It also usually includes a negative evaluation or criticism of such a statement or action, since standards of reasonability are not fulfilled. These standards may be rendered briefly by the keyword “well-founded”: opinions, actions, etc. are reasonable when they can be justified via reasons. Hence it is obvious that the meaning of “reasonable” is relative: opinions are defended relative to the argumentation standards possessed by the subject *S* in relation to the respective facts at the time *t*. And we could even add, following Tindale, that those standards of the subject are not isolated from a certain audience, but rather for the most part adapted from it. Whenever relative arguments are present, we can speak of “reasonableness” in a weak sense. In contrast, a “strong” concept of

rationality requires that the criteria to which one refers in the process of the relative substantiation of opinions and actions can themselves be proved as reasonable. The strong concept of reasonableness lays thus claim to universality: it implies that certain standards of substantiation can be justified independently of any audience. Regarding arguments, this would mean that there are norms, goals, or values which can be justified independently of a given specific audience which is being addressed.

At this point it seems necessary to introduce another distinction not always sufficiently addressed in the discussion of the relative validity of rationality. Whether or not it is reasonable to have opinion *p* depends on two conditions: on the one hand, on the respective cognitive condition; on the other hand, on the rules of rationality. By cognitive condition, I mean the whole set of accepted opinions, convictions, evidences, and goals possessed by a certain person at a certain period in time in front of a specific audience. This cognitive state must be distinguished from the rules of rationality. To be sure, both of them go hand in hand at every stage of reasoning. Even so, they can always be disentangled as its separate components.

Reasonableness is relative, first of all, with regard to the respective cognitive initial state. Secondly, it is relative with regard to certain rules or standards of theoretical reasonableness. Discussing the problem of reasonableness and its relativity, then, one has to be aware of the kind of relativity being referred to. The relativity regarding the respective cognitive initial state seems not only unproblematic, but it is even inevitable. The second type of relativity is different, though, in that it regards the rules of reasonableness. In so doing, it raises the question whether or not one can find such rules applicable to all audiences and, if so, which ones. A major problem of the relativistic view of reasonableness is that the expressions “reasonable” and “substantiated” lose their normal meaning. According to this view, “reasonable” is nothing more than “substantiated” for a certain person or a group of persons; in other words, for a specific audience. For the so-called “relativists”, the rules of reasonableness are exclusively dependent on the particular audience or context; they allow no context-independent judgment. As a result, any claim to universality is denied. Therefore, a relativist will maintain that standards of rationality are completely arbitrary and cannot be justified by reasons which go beyond the specific audience.

Where does the distinction between cognitive claims and rules of rationality and the related distinction between weak and strong sense of reasonableness lead us regarding Christopher Tindale’s claim that rhetoric is reasonable on its own terms? From what has been said so far it follows that we might indeed admit reasonableness of rhetoric in

A Case of Suspected Compression Plagiarism: N. 2006

In order to clarify my point, I am going first to distinguish between two different concepts of reasonableness: a strong and a weak one. Drawing upon this distinction, I shall further demonstrate in what sense Tindale refers to a weak concept, whereas the pragma-dialectic approach applies a strong concept of reasonableness. This clarification should help us, finally, to understand to what extent rhetoric might be considered as reasonable on its own terms.

If one departs from the colloquial use of the word "reasonable" or "rational",¹ one notices immediately that this term can encompass several different things depending on the objective area to which it is applied: deliberation, opinions, or arguments may be candidates for reasonableness within the cognitive area; actions within the behavioral area; and desires within the emotional area. When we call discourses, arguments, or thoughts reasonable, we are referring to them neither as to linguistic constructs nor as regards the respective content of their declarative statements (technically speaking, the proposition or the propositional subject matter). Such a content is either true or false, but not reasonable or unreasonable. Rather, by using the expression "reasonable" we are describing opinions in a much broader sense. In the following, "opinion" should be understood as a proposition held to be true. Holding a proposition to be true includes believing, expecting, supposing something, being convinced of something, considering its possibility, etc. So, holding an opinion is a relation between a subject (S) and a proposition (P), which can be formalized as "S is of the opinion that p...". To be exact, one has to add: S is of the opinion p at a certain point in time or during a certain period of time (t), i.e. "S is of the opinion p at time t."

A further insight into the meaning of the word "reasonable" can be gained by looking at its opposite. In contrast with simple descriptive words, the expression "unreasonable" possess a normative component in our cultural context. To say that someone is behaving unreasonably means not only to suggest that a certain statement or action of the subject has the named characteristic. It also usually includes a negative evaluation or criticism of such a statement or action, since standards of reasonability are not fulfilled. These standards may be rendered briefly by the keyword "well-founded": opinions, actions, etc. are reasonable when they can be justified via reasons. Hence it is obvious that the meaning of "reasonable" is relative: opinions are defended relative to the argumentation standards possessed by the subject S in relation to the respective facts at the time t. And we could even add, following Tindale, that those standards of the subject are not isolated from a certain audience, but rather for the most part adapted from it. Whenever relative arguments are present, we can speak of "reasonableness" in a weak sense. In contrast, a "strong" concept of

p. 21

p. 23

p. 24

p. 22

p. 49

p. 50

rationality requires that the criteria to which one refers in the process of the relative substantiation of opinions and actions can themselves be proved as reasonable. The strong concept of reasonableness lays thus claim to universality: it implies that certain standards of substantiation can be justified independently of any audience. Regarding arguments, this would mean that there are norms, goals, or values which can be justified independently of a given specific audience which is being addressed.

At this point it seems necessary to introduce another distinction not always sufficiently addressed in the discussion of the relative validity of rationality. Whether or not it is reasonable to have opinion p depends on two conditions: on the one hand, on the respective cognitive condition; on the other hand, on the rules of rationality. By cognitive condition, I mean the whole set of accepted opinions, convictions, evidences, and goals possessed by a certain person at a certain period in time in front of a specific audience. This cognitive state must be distinguished from the rules of rationality. To be sure, both of them go hand in hand at every stage of reasoning. Even so, they can always be disentangled as its separate components.

Reasonableness is relative, first of all, with regard to the respective cognitive initial state. Secondly, it is relative with regard to certain rules or standards of theoretical reasonableness. Discussing the problem of reasonableness and its relativity, then, one has to be aware of the kind of relativity being referred to. The relativity regarding the respective cognitive initial state seems not only unproblematic, but it is even inevitable. The second type of relativity is different, though, in that it regards the rules of reasonableness. In so doing, it raises the question whether or not one can find such rules applicable to all audiences and, if so, which ones. A major problem of the relativistic view of reasonableness is that the expressions "reasonable" and "substantiated" lose their normal meaning. According to this view, "reasonable" is nothing more than "substantiated" for a certain person or a group of persons; in other words, for a specific audience. For the so-called "relativists", the rules of reasonableness are exclusively dependent on the particular audience or context; they allow no context-independent judgment. As a result, any claim to universality is denied. Therefore, a relativist will maintain that standards of rationality are completely arbitrary and cannot be justified by reasons which go beyond the specific audience.

Where does the distinction between cognitive claims and rules of rationality and the related distinction between weak and strong sense of reasonableness lead us regarding Christopher Tindale's claim that rhetoric is reasonable on its own terms? From what has been said so far it follows that we might indeed admit reasonableness of rhetoric in

p. 50

p. 184

p. 185

p. 193

Suspected Compression *and* Translation Plagiarism: N. 2001

Studies in Communication Sciences, 1 (2001) 81-100

RATIONALITY AS A CONDITION FOR INTERCULTURAL UNDERSTANDING

The discussion of intercultural communication is confronted by quite serious challenges — at times even questions about whether and under what conditions communication with the foreigner is possible at all. In this paper, I first discuss how from a semiotic perspective, that of the Tartu-Moscow School of Semiotics, the discovery of new realities always demands the introduction of a code by which the newly discovered reality is identified and set in relation to segments of reality already known. Regarding this «external perspective», I discuss the alleged relativity of reason and argue that the «external perspective» requires a complementary description from the «internal perspective» of the actors. In the second part of the paper a semantic analysis of concepts is undertaken; it gives some indication of the sense in which the alleged relativity of reason can be accurately discussed and assessed. In conclusion, the rationality of intercultural communication is considered in light of this sharpened perspective.

Keywords: Intercultural communication, rationality; relativity of reason; semiotics.

0. Introduction

The topic of intercultural communication is currently experiencing nothing short of a boom. This also applies to a number of other social-scientific disciplines, such as linguistics and semiotics, philosophy, sociology and political science, social psychology and education or even international trade. Since the 19th century, various research traditions, especially

* Facoltà di Scienze della comunicazione, Università della Svizzera italiana, Lugano (Switzerland), @lu.unisi.ch.

Suspected compression *and* translation plagiarism

time when the dissolving of the traditional ethical order, begun in the 6th century B.C., was concluded: the traditional form of private and public life lost both its matter-of-factness as well as its unquestionable binding force. Besides the Persian wars, other possible reasons for this were the rise of international trade as well as travels for the purpose of education and research, travels which gave the Greeks an instant acquaintance with other cultures and ways of life. Experiencing that a behavior which was despised at home was accepted and even commanded in another place also caused a deep insecurity. Such insecurity resounds clearly in Herodotus's description of the funeral customs of the Greek and Indian calatier: «When Dareios was king, he once summoned all the Greeks in the vicinity to come to him, asking them to name the price for which they would be willing to consume the corpses of their fathers. They answered that no amount of money would be able to persuade them to do so. Whereupon Dareios summoned the Indian calatier, who eat the corpses of their parents, and, in the presence of the Greeks [...] asked them to name the price for which they would cremate their dead fathers. They shrieked and implored him earnestly to desist from such godless utterances.»⁵

The consequences which could be drawn from such insights as to the limited validity of allegedly generally valid values were of a different nature still. One could deduce from this that one's own tradition represents only one of many possible conventions, which would mean it could be ascribed only a conditional value. Other Greeks tried to measure the different cultural traditions against one common criterion; for example, one such criterion taken into consideration above all was reasonableness. By means of reason — understood as the source of knowledge of cosmic, divine things — the suitability of one's own tradition could be tested; in part also its superiority over other life forms could be proved. However, from the beginning, the attempt to cope theoretically with this crisis by a return to the claim of the universality of reason was countered by the demands of those who accepted the differences in customs as decisive evidence for a legitimate ethical relativism and scepticism practiced in daily life.

Here is not the place to detail the changing definition of reason in the course of Western thinking, which one could characterize — roughly

⁵ Herodot: *Historiae*: in 4 vol. With an English translation by A. D. Godley. London: Heinemann (The Loeb classical library), Vol. I, Book III, 38, 3-4.

speaking — as a process of progressive debilitation (cf. Baumgartner 1980). Thus, at the beginning of modern times, the problematic of the ancient idea of reason being aligned with cosmic truth resulted in different estimates of reason's efficacy. Hume's⁶ and Kant's criticism of the speculative nature of reason marked the beginning of the restriction of reason, thought to be overrated in its possibilities of self-reflection and unable to meet the excessive demands made of it. As an outgrowth of the course of this development, the increasing occupation with reason as an object of empirical research must certainly be included. Characteristic of this transition in the preoccupation with reason is surely the fact that since Max Weber, at the latest, the expression «reason» has been displaced by the new term «rationality», a term being not so negatively charged. The change in the terminology is due to the fact that «rationality» describes the empirically ascertainable human capability of thinking and acting reasonably, which itself is accessible to scientific investigation. The metaphysical misgiving attached to the term reason due to its linguistic history is bypassed through this terminological change. Still, the question remains: what is it that characterizes and constitutes rational communication with other cultures?

In our century — and so we come to the second example — the controversy surrounding the relativity of rationality has again become virulent; this time it was caused, among other things, by the rise of cultural anthropology and ethnology with their investigation of myths, rites and magic in archaic societies.⁷ The Occidental world-view's encounter with and discussion of mythic thinking led to the question of whether the standards of rationality in modern societies are, in fact, able to lay claim to universal validity or whether, instead, the term rational should be applied only to what is understood within the context of a particular way of life. This would mean that in modern societies a «higher» rationality of the sciences would be a chimera. The most prominent proponent of such a culturally relativistic view is philosopher Peter Winch, whose position is very near that of Ludwig Wittgenstein, the initiator of this continuing

⁶ One only has to think of David Hume's famous dictum: «Reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions.» (Hume 1978: 415).

⁷ A good outline of the current state of the discussion about the reception of magic in the social sciences of the 60's and 70's can be found in the anthology edited by Hans G. Kippenberg and Brigitte Lucheri (1978).

Suspected compression *and* translation plagiarism

p. 4

time when the dissolving of the traditional ethical order, begun in the 6th century B.C., was concluded: the traditional form of private and public life lost both its matter-of-factness as well as its unquestionable binding force. Besides the Persian wars, other possible reasons for this were the rise of international trade as well as travels for the purpose of education and research, travels which gave the Greeks an instant acquaintance with other cultures and ways of life. Experiencing that a behavior which was despised at home was accepted and even commanded in another place also caused a deep insecurity. Such insecurity resounds clearly in Herodotus's description of the funeral customs of the Greek and Indian calatier: «When Dareios was king, he once summoned all the Greeks in the vicinity to come to him, asking them to name the price for which they would be willing to consume the corpses of their fathers. They answered that no amount of money would be able to persuade them to do so. Whereupon Dareios summoned the Indian calatier, who eat the corpses of their parents, and, in the presence of the Greeks [...] asked them to name the price for which they would cremate their dead fathers. They shrieked and implored him earnestly to desist from such godless utterances.»⁵

p. 5

The consequences which could be drawn from such insights as to the limited validity of allegedly generally valid values were of a different nature still. One could deduce from this that one's own tradition represents only one of many possible conventions, which would mean it could be ascribed only a conditional value. Other Greeks tried to measure the different cultural traditions against one common criterion; for example, one such criterion taken into consideration above all was reasonableness. By means of reason — understood as the source of knowledge of cosmic, divine things — the suitability of one's own tradition could be tested; in part also its superiority over other life forms could be proved. However, from the beginning, the attempt to cope theoretically with this crisis by a return to the claim of the universality of reason was countered by the demands of those who accepted the differences in customs as decisive evidence for a legitimate ethical relativism and scepticism practiced in daily life.

p. 6

p. 11

Here is not the place to detail the changing definition of reason in the course of Western thinking, which one could characterize — roughly

p. 5

⁵ Herodotus: *Historiae*: in 4 vol. With an English translation by A. D. Godley. London: Heinemann (The Loeb classical library), Vol. I, Book III, 38, 3-4.

p. 11

p. 12

speaking — as a process of progressive debilitation (cf. Baumgartner 1980). Thus, at the beginning of modern times, the problematic of the ancient idea of reason being aligned with cosmic truth resulted in different estimates of reason's efficacy. Hume's⁶ and Kant's criticism of the speculative nature of reason marked the beginning of the restriction of reason, thought to be overrated in its possibilities of self-reflection and unable to meet the excessive demands made of it. As an outgrowth of the course of this development, the increasing occupation with reason as an object of empirical research must certainly be included. Characteristic of this transition in the preoccupation with reason is surely the fact that since Max Weber, at the latest, the expression «reason» has been displaced by the new term «rationality», a term being not so negatively charged. The change in the terminology is due to the fact that «rationality» describes the empirically ascertainable human capability of thinking and acting reasonably, which itself is accessible to scientific investigation. The metaphysical misgiving attached to the term reason due to its linguistic history is bypassed through this terminological change. Still, the question remains: what is it that characterizes and constitutes rational communication with other cultures?

p. 182

p. 183

In our century — and so we come to the second example — the controversy surrounding the relativity of rationality has again become virulent; this time it was caused, among other things, by the rise of cultural anthropology and ethnology with their investigation of myths, rites and magic in archaic societies.⁷ The Occidental world-view's encounter with and discussion of mythic thinking led to the question of whether the standards of rationality in modern societies are, in fact, able to lay claim to universal validity or whether, instead, the term rational should be applied only to what is understood within the context of a particular way of life. This would mean that in modern societies a «higher» rationality of the sciences would be a chimera. The most prominent proponent of such a culturally relativistic view is philosopher Peter Winch, whose position is very near that of Ludwig Wittgenstein, the initiator of this continuing

p. 346

p. 183

⁶ One only has to think of David Hume's famous dictum: «Reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions.» (Hume 1978: 415).

⁷ A good outline of the current state of the discussion about the reception of magic in the social sciences of the 60's and 70's can be found in the anthology edited by Hans G. Kippenberg and Brigitte Luchner (1978).

The Suspected Compression Plagiarism in N. 2001

p. 24

90

tion more closely; in these examples, the homogeneous meaning of an «irrational» opinion will be questioned.

a) Searching for someone's Internet address, although one knows for sure that the person does not have one.

b) Being sure that one will win a million Swiss francs in the next lottery.

c) Believing that one can throw a coin up in the air and have it remain suspended there.

d) Thinking that by not wearing a certain amulet to an interview, one will not get the job.

e) Believing that a politician will win the election on the basis of his/her own statement to that effect.

p. 25

The aforementioned examples represent irrational opinions, but in each case for different reasons. Calling the view contained in the first example «irrational» relies on the fact that it is obviously a logical contradiction: one cannot advocate two contradictory opinions at the same time and in the same sense, i.e., the opinion that an Internet address can be found as well as the knowledge that the person involved does not have an Internet link. Likewise, in the second example, a formally invalid deduction is present. Understanding lottery rules also means knowing that winning is dependent on the statistics of chance, not predictable certainty.

p. 26

Both these examples stand for the irrationality of opinions formed by invalid deductions. Although rationality deals with logical evaluation, the inconsistency of formal deductions is, nevertheless, insufficient to determine irrationality. In the case of the third example, certain evidence was not considered — and thus an inductive conclusion was omitted: a general conclusion could have been drawn from one's experience that objects thrown into the air do not remain suspended there.

p. 27

More clearly still, the fourth example illustrates that rationality is also not sufficiently defined by inductive or deductive conclusions. One would like to know whether the person involved possesses a good reason to suppose the affirmation offered here. Such an opinion could only be called rational when the reason for the affirmation would seem acceptable — which may be doubted about an amulet.

With regard to this example of the amulet, it appears obvious that an opinion can be called rational only when the opinion's proponent has justifiable reasons for it. Thereby, the ability to justify an opinion is not solely a matter of deductive or inductive reasoning, but of a general ability to justify statements, i.e., to give an account of them. Both the Greek expression «λόγον δίδοναι» as well as the Latin «rationem reddere» suggest

this meaning, too.¹¹ And the corresponding translation «reason», «raison», or «ragione» means, respectively, «a reason» and «reason». An opinion is therefore substantiated by reason when it can be derived logically correctly from the reasons justifying it. In general: «S's opinion at the time *t* is rational and reasonable when *S* at the time *t* has good reason(s) to be of the opinion that *P*».

It is important to note that the justifying reasons of opinions are not just any reasons, but only those which may be considered so-called «good reasons», which may certainly be maintained by certain cultural standards. Let us look at the fifth example: the opinion that one should believe the prognosis of the politician merely on the strength of his/her saying so appears to be unacceptable in our culture, since for prognoses concerning election results we rely on other criteria besides the politician's own assertions. Here, experiential data other than the self-assessment of a politician are considered «good reasons».

We can also now specify what an irrational opinion is: it is an unsubstantiated opinion formed on the basis of an avoidable error in thinking. If we accuse a person of irrational views, then we also presuppose that an irrational opinion is capable of being corrected. To that extent, the concept of the stating of reasons is closely intertwined with that of learning, as was already known in antiquity and is often enough stressed in modern scholarship (Habermas 1988; Jarvie 1972¹²). Thus, an essential constituent of the term rationality is the process of clarifying irrational opinions, a process which aims to accentuate the actual reasons.

Now it is reasonable to assume that in the same way that opinions may be called reasonable, the same can be said of actions. For rationality of actions, too, just like opinions, is connected with their possible probability. An action is rational if the actor can defend why s/he does what s/he does. Certainly, we must protect ourselves against anything leading

¹¹ The Greek expression λογίζεσθαι and the Latin expressions *rationem reddere*, *rationari* or *calculari* include the sense of both numerical «calculations» as well as deliberation and logical inference. Cf. the articles «Denken» and «Rechnen» in *Handwörterbuch der Philosophie 2* (1972): 64–66. In the last century, this indeterminate ambiguity in both Greek and Latin led to the expression «calculated thought», in which Martin Heidegger, for example, perceived a characteristic feature of modern rationality.

¹² According to J. C. Jarvie, one should conceive of the commonality of rationality to include at least the change and correction of ideas required by all individual societies, i.e., learning from experience to the extent that mistakes are recognized. To be sure, Jarvie limits learning from mistakes to the area of scientific knowledge. See in addition and in contrast: Alasdair MacIntyre (1984).

p. 27

p. 28

p. 29

p. 36

p. 50

94

tive facts at the time *t*. The same applies to actions which are justified relative to their underlying goals. Wherever relative arguments are present, we can speak of «rationality» in a weak sense. In contrast, a «stronger» concept of rationality would be present where the criteria themselves, to which one refers with regard to the relative substantiation of opinions and actions, once again can be proved as reasonable. The strong concept of rationality takes up the initial example from antiquity in which rationality's claim to universality was described: this accompanies the supposition that certain standards of substantiation can themselves be culturally justified. Regarding actions, this would mean that there are norms, goals or values which themselves can be justified independent of the respective cultural province.

Now, concerning the relativity of arguments, a distinction seems necessary to me which is not always sufficiently addressed in the discussion of the relative validity of rationality. Whether or not it is rational to have opinion *P* depends on two conditions: on the one hand, the respective cognitive condition on the other hand, the rules of rationality. By cognitive condition, I mean the whole set of accepted opinions, convictions, evidence, and goals possessed by a certain person at a certain period in time.¹³ This cognitive state must first of all be differentiated from the rules of rationality. Both go along with reasoning even if one can separate them into individual problems in each case. This distinction may be clarified on the basis of the aforementioned study of the ethnologist Evans-Pritchard. Among other things, he describes the rain dance practices of the African native Azande tribe. These practices can be reconstructed by including the underlying cognitive state. For they incorporate the view that gods, spirits and magicians rule over the powers of nature and can cause rain. For it to rain, the gods and spirits must be aroused by befitting practices (Evans-Pritchard 1937). If one questions how the Azande can maintain these opinions in face of evidence to the contrary (as viewed by a West European), then the rules of rationality become the issue.

p. 184

p. 185

p. 184

p. 185

¹³ The cognitive state might be related to the hermeneutical «principle of charity». The meaning of this principle of interpretative charity is that irrational behavior should not be attributed to people whose language and culture are foreign; rather, one's own inability to understand them should be taken into account. Relating this to the cognitive initial condition, the principle of interpretative charity may be formulated as follows: «Interpret others so that their statements are reasonable in the light of their own convictions and traditions.» The consequences of this principle for intercultural communication are addressed in detail by E. Holstenstein (1998).

The example shows that one is able to speak of two possible types of the relativity of rationality. Rationality is relative first of all in relation to the respective cognitive state. Secondly, there is at the same time a relativity in relation to certain rules or standards of theoretical rationality. If one discusses the problem of rationality and its relativity then one has to be aware of the kind of relativity being referred to. The relativity which refers to the respective state seems not only unproblematic but it is even inevitable. This understanding would be overlooked or even disregarded where one sought to explain the behavior of natives according to Western European standards, declaring the natives to be irrational upon the failure of this attempt. Certain practices such as magic and witchcraft are rational, at least in a weak sense, since they correspond with the cognitive state of so-called primitive peoples.¹⁴ The second type of relativity, though, is different; it refers to the rules of rationality which question whether or not one can find rules applicable to all cultures and, if so, which ones.

A major problem of the relativist view of rationality consists of the fact that the expressions «rational» and «substantiated» lose their normal meaning. According to this view, «rational» is nothing more than «substantiated» for a certain person or a group of people. For the so-called «cultural relativists», the rules of rationality are exclusively dependent on the particular culture or context; they allow no context-independent judgment. As a result, any claim to universality is denied. Therefore, a relativist will maintain that the standards of rationality are completely arbitrary and cannot be justified by reasons which exceed the cultural context.¹⁵

¹⁴ Concerning the different cognitive initial states, these so-called thesis of incommensurability cannot be discussed in particular in the context of these remarks. According to this view, specified by scientific theoreticians such as Thomas S. Kuhn (1993) and Paul Feyerabend (1997), the expressions used in another culture cannot be equated with the expressions of one's own culture with regard to meaning. Suffice it to say that from the diverging views underlying the different cognitive initial states, it need not follow that understanding is impossible, being realized by a transfer of different views into one's own expressions and definitions. Rather, it is an established fact of human experience that we do not intend to make only sweeping evaluations, but that we are also capable of mutually interpreting our convictions, desires, and declarations in such a nuanced way that they are also meaningful to a certain extent.

¹⁵ Thus, one bases the standard of rationality on the respective initial state. Whereas Lévy-Bruhl places «wild thoughts» in a «pre-logical» stage of knowing and acting, Evans-Pritchard shows in his studies about the Azande's belief in witches that the difference lies in the discrepant world views mirroring the background knowledge of social groups: the relativity of theoretical rationality refers to the relativity of the cognitive initial state. This conclusion is based on the idea that, due to the change of «good reasons» in the course of history and in the different cultures, it may also be determined that the standards for the rules of rationality are relative.

p. 184

p. 185

p. 187

p. 193

Solutions: What can Editors and Publishers do to Dis-incentivize Academic Plagiarism?

- Avoid imposing statutes of limitations for plagiarism
- Assign DOIs to all older articles
- Communicate corrections to database/indexing services
- Correct secondary venues in which articles appear


THIS ARTICLE HAS BEEN RETRACTED

Conscience in Renaissance moral thought: a concept in transition?

First published: 19 August 2009 | <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-4658.2009.00603.x>

SECTIONS

PDF TOOLS SHARE



Conscience in Renaissance moral thought: a concept in transition?

I know myself now, and I feel within me
A peace above all earthly dignities,
A still and quiet conscience.

William Shakespeare,
The Life of King Henry the Eighth
(Wolsey at III, ii)

The phenomenon identified and studied by philosophers, theologians, historians, and social scientists under the suggestive heading of 'conscience', has been subject to considerable historical change. Our current appreciation of the origin and function of conscience, and its place within the vibrant economy of moral thought and action, is indebted to a surfeit of multifarious notions that the present era has inherited from pagan, biblical, medieval, and early modern sources.¹ While the antecedents to prevailing scruples were formed by Greco-Roman ideas of a self-awareness of our own moral culpability,² and doubtless conditioned by biblical and scholastic arguments that stressed an intimate connection between conscience and an internalized natural law,³ contemporary understanding of both the status and juridical authority of conscience, as well as its proverbial characterization as an internal

¹ On Greco-Roman and New Testament ideas of conscience see P. Delhaye, *Le conscience morale de Clément* (Louvain: Desclée, 1941); U. Steyer, *Entstehung und Entwicklung des Gewissens im Spiegel der griechischen Tragödie* (Bern: Peter Lang, 1972); Henry Chadwick, 'Conscience in ancient thought', in *Studies in Ancient Christianity* (Aldershot: Variorum, 2000); C. A. Pierce, *Conscience in the New Testament* (London: SCM, 1953); P. R. Boman, *Conscience in Paul and Philo* (Tübingen: Mohr, 2005); and Richard Sorabji, 'Conscience: Pagan and Platonic contributions to the concept', *Studia Patristica*, forthcoming.

² These last ideas are especially strong in Cicero and Seneca who attacked what they deemed to be the un-Christian idea of conscience advanced by the Epicureans. It was from these Stoic sources that early Christian theologians, such as Clement of Alexandria and Origen, advanced the idea that conscience was innate. See A. C. Lloyd, 'Nouus utramque conscientia', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, 46 (1964), 188–200; G. Michalson, 'Seneca's use of the term conscientia', *Monist*, 4 (1980), 170–86; Sarah Baruch, *The Mirror of Nature* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2006); and Douglas Kees, 'Origen, Plato and Conscience (and/or) in Jerome's Ezechiel Commentary', *Trinitas*, 57 (2002), 67–83. See also Matthias Perkams, *Selbstverurteilung in der Spätantike: die spätantiken Konzepte zu Aristoteles' De anima* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2008), 404–10.

³ See Pierce, *Conscience in the New Testament*, 60–103; M. B. Croom, *The Changing Profile of Natural Law* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977); Troels Engberg-Pedersen, *Paul and the Stoics* (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 2000), 271–2 and 375–6; and Boman, *Conscience in Paul and Philo* (2005), 65–125.



Search JSTOR

All Content

Advanced Search

Browse

Tools

Renaissance Stu... / Vol. 23, No. 4... / Conscience in R...



JOURNAL ARTICLE

Conscience in Renaissance moral thought: a concept in transition?

Renaissance Studies

Vol. 23, No. 4, THE RENAISSANCE

CONSCIENCE (SEPTEMBER 2009), pp. 423-444

Download (\$46.00)

Subscribe (\$19.50)

Save

Cite this Item

Conscience in Renaissance moral thought: a concept in transition?

I know myself now, and I feel within me
A peace above all earthly dignities,
A still and quiet conscience.

William Shakespeare,
The Life of King Henry the Eighth
(Wolsey at III, ii)

The phenomenon identified and studied by philosophers, theologians, historians, and social scientists under the suggestive heading of 'conscience', has been subject to considerable historical change. Our current appreciation of the origin and function of conscience, and its place within the vibrant economy of moral thought and action, is indebted to a surfeit of multifarious notions that the present era has inherited from pagan, biblical, medieval, and early modern sources.¹ While the antecedents to prevailing scruples were formed by Greco-Roman ideas of a self-awareness of our own moral culpability,² and doubtless conditioned by biblical and scholastic arguments that stressed an intimate connection between conscience and an internalized natural law,³ contemporary understanding of both the status and juridical authority of conscience, as well as its proverbial characterization as an internal

¹ On Greco-Roman and New Testament ideas of conscience see P. Delhaye, *Le conscience morale de Clément* (Louvain: Desclée, 1941); U. Steyer, *Entstehung und Entwicklung des Gewissens im Spiegel der griechischen Tragödie* (Bern: Peter Lang, 1972); Henry Chadwick, 'Conscience in ancient thought', in *Studies in Ancient Christianity* (Aldershot: Variorum, 2000); C. A. Pierce, *Conscience in the New Testament* (London: SCM, 1953); P. R. Boman, *Conscience in Paul and Philo* (Tübingen: Mohr, 2005); and Richard Sorabji, 'Conscience: Pagan and Platonic contributions to the concept', *Studia Patristica*, forthcoming.

² These last ideas are especially strong in Cicero and Seneca who attacked what they deemed to be the un-Christian idea of conscience advanced by the Epicureans. It was from these Stoic sources that early Christian theologians, such as Clement of Alexandria and Origen, advanced the idea that conscience was innate. See A. C. Lloyd, 'Nouus utramque conscientia', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, 46 (1964), 188–200; G. Michalson, 'Seneca's use of the term conscientia', *Monist*, 4 (1980), 170–86; Sarah Baruch, *The Mirror of Nature* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2006); and Douglas Kees, 'Origen, Plato and Conscience (and/or) in Jerome's Ezechiel Commentary', *Trinitas*, 57 (2002), 67–83. See also Matthias Perkams, *Selbstverurteilung in der Spätantike: die spätantiken Konzepte zu Aristoteles' De anima* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2008), 404–10.

³ See Pierce, *Conscience in the New Testament*, 60–103; M. B. Croom, *The Changing Profile of Natural Law* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977); Troels Engberg-Pedersen, *Paul and the Stoics* (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 2000), 271–2 and 375–6; and Boman, *Conscience in Paul and Philo* (2005), 65–125.

◀ ◀ ◀ [previous article in this issue](#)

Document Details :

Title: The Origins of Probabilism in Late Scholastic Moral Thought

Subtitle: A Prolegomenon to Further Study

Author(s)

Journal: [Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales](#)

Volume: 67 **Issue:** 1 **Date:** 2000

Pages: 114-157

DOI: 10.2143/RTPM.67.1.520

Abstract :

This article is no longer available online. We refer to the [editorial note](#) published in *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales* 76.2 (2009).

If you try to download this article, you will only see the editorial note, not the article itself.

A NOTE FROM THE EDITORIAL BOARD

On November 12, 2009, the Editorial Board was notified by Dr. I. Kantola, the Finnish Luther-Agricola-Society, and Prof. M.V. Dougherty (Ohio Dominican University) that Dr. Kantola's monograph, *Probabilism and Moral Uncertainty in Late Medieval and Early Modern Times* (Helsinki, Luther-Agricola-Society, 1994) was plagiarized by Dr. M.W.F. Stone in his article «The Origins of Probabilism in Late Scholastic Moral Thought: A Prolegomenon to Further Study», published in our journal some nine years ago¹.

The evidence of plagiarism provided to the Editorial Board is overwhelming and irrefutable. Stone not only adopted the general structure of Kantola's study and discussed the very same authors, but also copied numerous and extensive passages from Kantola's book (mainly *verbatim*) without ever referring to Kantola and without having obtained permission to copy Kantola's work. Apparently, only the brief introduction, some transitional paragraphs, and the short epilogue were not taken from Kantola's book.

Moreover, it has become clear that in this same article Stone made unacknowledged use of at least one other study. On p. 117, Stone's argument on the meaning of the technical term *probabilis* is clearly indebted to the analysis given by J. Mahoney in his study *The Making of Moral Theology*², to which Stone refers only at p. 143.

The Editorial Board has unanimously decided that M.W.F. Stone's article must be retracted. His paper will no longer be made available electronically by the Publisher, and labels indicating the plagiarism and the retraction will be sent by the Publisher to all subscribers to the journal. We urge all subscribers to place these labels on both the first and the last page of Stone's article so as to prevent further references to the article in future publications.

1. M.W.F. STONE, «The Origins of Probabilism in Late Scholastic Moral Thought: A Prolegomenon to Further Study», in: *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales* 67 (2000), pp. 114-157.

2. See J. MAHONEY, *The Making of Moral Theology. A Study of the Roman Catholic Tradition*, Oxford 1987, p. 136. — After this incident was first reported to the Editorial Board of the *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales*, many other of Stone's articles have been revealed to contain extensive plagiarized material from various authors.

A NOTE FROM THE EDITORIAL BOARD

The evidence of plagiarism provided to the Editorial Board is overwhelming and irrefutable.

article must be retracted.



Search JSTOR

All Content



JSTOR

Advanced Search

Browse

Tools

[Recherches de t...](#) / [Vol. 67, No. 1...](#) / THE ORIGINS OF ...



JOURNAL ARTICLE

THE ORIGINS OF PROBABILISM IN LATE SCHOLASTIC MORAL THOUGHT: A PROLEGOMENON TO FURTHER STUDY

Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales

Vol. 67, No. 1 (2000), pp. 114-157

Published by: [Peeters Publishers](#)

Read Online

Subscribe (\$19.50)

Save

[Cite this Item](#)

[Journal Info](#)



THE ORIGINS OF PROBABILISM IN LATE SCHOLASTIC MORAL THOUGHT: A PROLEGOMENON TO FURTHER STUDY

The diversity in human character and mood is beyond belief; diversity not only among the mass of men, but in the same man; and in that man not only in different years or months or weeks, but also from day to day, hour to hour and even moment to moment.

Jean Gerson, *De perfectione cordis*¹.


Even now, at the close of the twentieth century, the study of late scholastic moral thought has still to come of age. While scholars have expended much effort in recent years on the study of the logic, metaphysics, natural philosophy and theology of the later middle ages², the problems and issues of the moral thought of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries remain largely unfamiliar to students of medieval

Solutions: What can Editors and Publishers do to Dis-incentivize Academic Plagiarism?

- Avoid imposing statutes of limitations for plagiarism
- Assign DOIs to all older articles
- Communicate corrections to database/indexing services
- Correct secondary venues in which articles appear
- Don't let plagiarists write errata or corrigenda in lieu of retracting plagiarizing papers
- Indicate clearly to readers how suspected authorship misconduct should be reported

Michael V. Dougherty
Ohio Dominican University

IN THE AFTERMATH OF AUTHORSHIP VIOLATIONS IN PHILOSOPHY: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS



COPE North American Seminar 2019
Philadelphia
May 3, 2019